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Note
Armchair Jury Consultants: The Legal
Implications and Benefits of Online Research of
Prospective Jurors in the Facebook Era
Adam J. Hoskins
In the 2003 film Runaway Jury, Rankin Fitch—played by
Gene Hackman—justifies his role as a scientific jury consultant
1
by saying that “trials are too important to be left up to juries.”
At one point, this pronouncement carried the day in the American legal system, as jury consultants were de rigueur in the
2
courtroom and scientific jury consulting was a $400 million per
3
year industry. Jury consultants were—and, to a lesser extent,
still are—used before, during, and after jury selection in high4
stakes cases. These trial consultants, though considered by
5
many to be effective analysts of juror tendencies, were often
6
prohibitively expensive.

 J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2008,
Truman State University. The author would like to thank Professor Perry
Moriearty for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process. Many
thanks also to the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their tireless work and dedication. Finally, the author would like to thank his wonderful family and friends for their unwavering support and patience. Copyright ©
2012 by Adam J. Hoskins.
1. RUNAWAY JURY (20th Century Fox 2003).
2. See Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A
Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What,
If Anything, to Do About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442– 43 (“So common is consulting in large jury trials that one Boston trial lawyer opined, ‘[n]o selfrespecting trial lawyer will go through the process of jury selection in an important case without the assistance of highly-paid trial consultants.’” (citation
omitted)).
3. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J. Stover, The Information Age,
Part II: Juror Investigation on the Internet—Implications for the Trial Lawyer,
2 SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 211 (2001) ( providing background information on the
economic impact of jury consultants).
4. See id.
5. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 460 (“‘When real juror verdicts are at issue, [scientific jury selection] has been shown to increase the
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The advent of the Internet has made attorneys everywhere
7
into amateur jury consultants. Many states facilitate such investigation by releasing information about prospective jurors
8
weeks before jury selection. In these states, attorneys are free
to search public records, perform Google searches on prospective jurors, or access jurors’ Facebook pages long before jury se9
lection begins. States that do not provide juror information in
advance have seen attorneys use laptops in the courtroom to
10
research potential jurors. This pretrial investigation of jurors
is often effective in revealing information about prospective jurors, as an increasing amount of Americans have detectable
11
online presences. In this relatively uncharted technological
area, there are competing concerns—some practitioners say it
is tantamount to malpractice not to conduct Internet research
12
on prospective jurors, while others warn that this practice is

predictability of juror verdicts appreciably, especially if the evidence in the
case is at all equivocal.’” (citation omitted)).
6. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 212.
7. See, e.g., id. at 211–12 (discussing how “the dawn of the internet age
has provided a powerful new investigatory tool that can be utilized by attorneys themselves,” even in small cases).
8. See, e.g., State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 453 (N.C. 1977) (noting
juror information released fifty-five days prior to the start of trial).
9. See, e.g., Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for
Lawyers, 28 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 12, 13–14 (2009) (recommending a series of
online searches on potential jurors).
10. See, e.g., Evan Brown, Judge Should Have Let Lawyer Google Potential Jurors During Jury Selection, INTERNET CASES (Sept. 4, 2010), http://blog
.internetcases.com/2010/09/04/judge-should-have-let-lawyer-google-potentialjurors-during-jury-selection/ (examining a New Jersey state judge’s attempt to
prohibit attorneys from researching potential witnesses during jury selection
using the courthouse’s wireless Internet).
11. See Jeffrey T. Frederick, You, the Jury, and the Internet, 39 BRIEF 12,
17 (2010) (noting that 77% of American adults use the Internet and 47% use
social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter). Further, the fact that a
prospective juror does not have a detectable Internet presence conveys certain
demographic information—age, intelligence, income level—that savvy attorneys may use in jury selection. Id.
12. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 218 (describing attorneys as
bound by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to perform all possible Internet research on prospective jurors); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” (emphasis added)).
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14

ethically murky, invades jurors’ privacy, and contributes to
15
biased juries.
Part I of this Note introduces the practice of jury investigation and describes its evolution and increasing prevalence in
the Internet era. Part II identifies and analyzes the typical criticisms of preselection jury investigation. Part III contends,
however, that pretrial online investigation of potential jurors
comports with the rationale of peremptory challenges, allows
for more equal trial preparation between rich and cashstrapped parties, and helps create more impartial juries and
fairer trials. Finally, this Note proposes that because pretrial
jury investigation results in fairer trials, states should uniformly adopt a standard of providing information about potential jurors in advance of jury selection, and explicitly sanction such
investigation.
I. BACKGROUND ON INTERNET-BASED JUROR
RESEARCH: A NEW LOOK AT A LONGSTANDING
PRACTICE
While online pretrial Internet research of jurors is a relatively recent phenomenon, it is one that can be understood by
examining longstanding jurisprudence on issues regarding jury
selection. This Part examines the constitutional right to a jury
trial, the process by which a jury is selected, the legality and
prevalence of paid jury consultants, and the connection between jury selection and fairness of trials.
A. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that in criminal trials, a defendant has “the right to a
16
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State.”
Although the Constitution is silent on the matter, courts have
defined an “impartial jury” as one that is “capable and willing
to decide the case solely on the evidence before it” and not
13. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 218 (outlining a countervailing argument that there are potential ethical concerns when conducting Internet research on prospective jurors).
14. See Michael R. Glover, Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective
Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 708, 713 (1982) (warning that information gathered from outside investigation may implicate privacy concerns).
15. See id. at 716–17 (theorizing that these privacy concerns may affect
the partiality of the jury, implicating Sixth Amendment issues).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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17

based on outside knowledge or prejudice. Judges have considerable discretion in investigating alleged partialities among ju18
rors and may dismiss individual jurors or declare a mistrial to
19
remedy such partialities.
In addition to the Sixth Amendment protection for criminal
juries, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury in
20
many civil cases. The right to a jury is available “[i]n Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twen21
ty dollars.” The right to a civil jury extends only to cases in22
volving legal, as opposed to equitable, claims. Since many new
causes of action developed after the distinction between courts
of law and equity was eliminated, courts determine the right to
a jury trial for such claims by analogy to the Eighteenth Centu23
ry courts of law and equity.
B. JUROR SELECTION PROCESS
The jury-selection process is responsible for populating
24
these constitutionally protected juries. Voir dire is the method
by which potential jurors—known as veniremen—are ques25
tioned about their predispositions and biases. Depending on
the state, the court, parties’ counsel, or a combination conducts
26
the juror examination. As part of the voir dire examination,
17. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Greig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 697, 701 (D.V.I.
2001) (discussing the process by which the court explored an allegation that a
juror disclosed extraneous and prejudicial information about the defendant).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 959 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting trial judges’ considerable discretion to remedy alleged impartiality).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
21. Id.
22. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348
(1998) (“[T]he Court has understood ‘Suits at common law’ to refer ‘not merely
[to] suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.’”(citation omitted)).
23. See id. at 348– 49.
24. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2000).
25. See generally id. §§ 4 –5 (discussing various modes of conducting voir
dire in the state and federal systems).
26. Compare FED R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1) (“The court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the attorneys for the parties to do so.”), and ALASKA
R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (identical to Federal Rule), with MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02
subdiv. 4 (“The court must allow the parties to conduct voir dire examination
to discover grounds for challenges for cause and to assist in the exercise of
peremptory challenges.”).
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prospective jurors may be asked questions, either orally or in
27
writing. Such questions must be connected to the prospective
28
jurors’ ability to serve fairly and impartially. In some cases,
29
such a process can last several days. Trial judges retain a
30
large amount of discretion in structuring the voir dire process.
Potential jurors may be eliminated from the jury pool
through two mechanisms—strikes for cause and peremptory
31
challenges. Counsel may strike an unlimited number of jurors
32
for cause. Today, challenges for cause fall into one of two cate33
gories. The propter defectum class of challenges are brought
because of a perceived defect in the prospective juror, such as
34
“alienage, infancy, [or] lack of statutory requirement . . . .”
The second class of challenges, the propter affectum class, may
be brought when jurors have “some bias or partiality” that af35
fects their competence to serve as a juror. For purposes of this
Note, only the propter affectum class of challenges is relevant.
When considering whether to disqualify a prospective juror
for cause, courts look to the probability of bias or prejudice that
would result by allowing the prospective juror to sit on the ju36
ry. A trial court generally must “consider the totality of the
circumstances and grounds relating to a potential request to
excuse a prospective juror, [and] to make a full inquiry to ex37
amine those circumstances . . . .” Any doubts about a juror’s
38
qualifications must be resolved in favor of excusing the juror.
Challenges for cause must be premised on an individual’s actu-

27. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 43 (2000).
28. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 472 S.E.2d 842, 851 (N.C. 1996).
29. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 13.
30. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (citing Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973)).
31. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 61 (2000).
32. See id. § 68.
33. See, e.g., Butler v. Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 145 S.E. 3, 4 (N.C. 1928)
(noting a transition away from the traditional challenges that were “subdivided at common law into four classes: Propter honoris respectum, out of respect
of rank or honor; propter defectum, on account of some defect; propter
delictum, on account of crime; and propter affectum, on account of affection or
prejudice”).
34. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 682 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1984).
35. Id. at 923–24.
36. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Miller, 565 S.E.2d 407, 411 (W. Va. 2002).
37. E.g., Black v. CSX Transp., Inc., 648 S.E.2d 610, 615–16 (W. Va.
2007).
38. See, e.g., id. at 616.
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al qualifications and biases and not on assumptions based on
39
stereotypes.
In addition to challenges for cause, many jurisdictions pro40
vide parties with a certain number of peremptory challenges.
41
If the jurisdiction allows such challenges, counsel may exercise their allotted challenges to strike any potential juror with42
out cause. Counsel typically strike jurors perceived to be resistant to their case, basing their decisions on information
gleaned from the voir dire, jury questionnaire, juror research,
43
or on stereotypes. When selecting the jury, attorneys often rely on their experience and intuition to inform their selections,
making decisions about jurors based on their “gender, profession, nationality, race, religion, physical features, economic
44
strata, and even gait.” Clarence Darrow’s jury selection strategy offers a glimpse into the role of stereotyping in jury selec45
tion. Darrow suggested that a lawyer “[n]ever take a wealthy
man on a jury. He will convict unless the defendant is accused
of violating the anti-trust law, selling worthless stocks or bonds
46
or something of that kind.” Additionally, he stated both that
47
“[an Irishman] is emotional, kindly and sympathetic” and that
lawyers should keep “Unitarians, Universalists, Congregation48
alists, Jews and other agnostics.”
There are limits to peremptory challenges, however. In jury selection, attorneys are not allowed to exercise their peremp49
50
tory challenges based solely on the race or sex of the prospective juror. Prospective jurors can be excluded, however, for
other Darrow-esque demographic factors, such as religion, po39. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 922 A.2d 1107, 1111 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
40. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992) (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991)).
41. See id. (describing peremptory challenges as a state creation and not
constitutionally protected by the Sixth Amendment).
42. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 72 (2000).
43. See id. §§ 84 –89.
44. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 465.
45. See Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at
36, 211.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 37.
48. Id. at 211.
49. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); see also Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991) (extending the Batson ruling
to civil trials).
50. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson’s ruling
to peremptory challenges based on juror’s sex).
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51

litical affiliation, or age. Though courts have, in dicta, discouraged the use of peremptory challenges based on stereotype
52
alone, attorneys generally have considerable latitude in exer53
cising their peremptory challenges.
C. JURY CONSULTING AND RESEARCH ON PROSPECTIVE JURORS
Attorneys have long conducted pretrial research on pro54
spective jurors. The limits of juror investigation are set only
55
56
and ethical constraints.
Courts both
by local rules
acknowledge and permit pretrial investigation of potential ju57
rors. Many jurisdictions facilitate pretrial investigation by
providing attorneys with names of potential jurors weeks be58
fore trial. Courts that do not release jury lists in advance often
have wireless Internet connections for attorneys to use during
59
jury selection. A party’s legal team can use this Internet ac51. See Charles Nesson, Peremptory Challenges: Technology Should Kill
Them?, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 10 (2004) (“[R]ace and gender now stand
as the only declared impermissible bases for peremptory challenges, but these
lack any strong distinction from other demographic factors like religion or politics or age, which apparently continue to be legitimate grounds for peremptory challenges.”).
52. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142.
53. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 32 P.3d 292, 295 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (citing United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000)) (noting that
peremptory strikes reinforce Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury).
54. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3.
55. Id. at 212; see also, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 807 (detailing regulations relating to juror questionnaires).
56. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 219 (noting attorneys’ ethical
responsibility, under the ABA standards, to use only “investigatory methods
that neither harass nor unduly embarrass potential jurors or invade their
privacy”).
57. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“It
is a recognized practice for an attorney to make investigations of prospective
jurors so that [ peremptory] challenges can be utilized intelligently . . . . There
is no doubt that pretrial investigations of prospective jurors are both legal and
common.”).
58. See, e.g., State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 453 (N.C. 1977); Redgrave
& Stover, supra note 3, at 212 (“[M]any of these state laws explicitly state that
the reason for releasing jury lists prior to voir dire is to permit counsel to undertake pretrial investigation of prospective jurors.”).
59. See Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 316 (2010) (discussing how the Internet should be
provided in courtrooms because “[i]n order to properly present their case,
counsel must have stable access to laptops, cell phones, and other such technologies”). But see Katherine A. Helm, Courtrooms All Atwitter, NAT’L L.J.
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202432841336
(noting that some courtrooms have “bar[red] all communication devices from
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cess to research prospective jurors during jury selection. When
given juror information in advance, attorneys frequently outsource this juror investigation to jury consultants, especially in
61
high-stakes or high-profile cases. Attorneys and their hired
jury consultants have considerable leeway in researching prospective jurors, provided that they refrain from contacting the
62
jurors or their families. Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, attorneys are responsible for the actions of those
working for or underneath them, including jury consultants or
63
paralegals conducting juror research.
The practice of researching potential jurors implicates con64
siderable privacy concerns. Though individuals may cede cer65
tain privacy expectations by performing public duties, individuals do not, by becoming jurors, forfeit any of their
66
constitutionally protected rights to privacy. Generally, however, courts have found that individuals engaging in online communication—chat rooms, blog postings and other publicly
searchable communication—do not have a reasonable expecta67
tion of privacy with respect to those communications. Regardless, to allay privacy concerns, many practitioners caution
against “overt references to a juror’s personal information” that
68
has been discovered through outside research.

courtrooms” after a spate of mistrials based on impermissible outside research
from jurors themselves).
60. See McGee, supra note 59, at 319–20.
61. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3.
62. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2010) (“[A lawyer shall
not] communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order.”).
63. See id. R. 5.3(c).
64. See Glover, supra note 14, at 712 n.22 (“The privacy concerns in the
voir dire context are identical to those in cases that have recognized the right’s
existence.”).
65. See id. at 711–12.
66. See, e.g., People v. James, 710 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995)).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 –85
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding no expectation of privacy in e-mail and chat room
discussions); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001) (finding no expectation of privacy for personal website).
68. Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14.
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D. PREVALENCE OF PRETRIAL INTERNET RESEARCH
Because the use of pretrial jury research has long been
69
sanctioned and acknowledged by the courts, attorneys have
not been shy in their use of Internet research as a litigation
70
tool. Because the official juror information provided by the
71
courts is so limited, attorneys use Internet research in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage over the opposing par72
ty. Whereas extensive research on a jury venire would have
been prohibitively expensive in the pre-Internet era, attorneys
can now quickly and anonymously gather an immense amount
of information about prospective jurors through Internet re73
search.
Pretrial Internet research on jurors and prospective jurors
74
is now the industry standard for litigators. This widespread
75
76
practice has been noted by practitioners, scholars, journal77
78
ists, and courts themselves. Some practitioners even claim
that to not conduct this research is tantamount to malpractice
79
and a failure to zealously advocate for one’s client.
Practicing attorneys offer a variety of advice on how best to
mine the Internet for information on prospective jurors. Google
searches, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, consumer complaint
80
81
websites, arrest records, jurors’ personal blogs, online news69. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
70. See, e.g., Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 213–15.
71. See id. at 212 (“Given the general paucity of information concerning
prospective jurors officially provided to counsel, such [ pretrial Internet] investigation may be necessary in order to accurately identify those jurors who
should be challenged.”).
72. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 13 (“[R]esearch may reveal detailed individual profiles of the prospective jurors . . . and may provide you with exclusive information that opposing counsel had not uncovered.”).
73. See Redgrave and Stover, supra note 3, at 214 (“The internet’s most
profound effects can be seen in the type and scope of information that can be
discovered, as well as the anonymity with which attorneys can now learn intimate details about a juror’s personal life.”).
74. See id. at 211.
75. See, e.g., id.
76. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 51, at 1.
77. See, e.g., John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1.
78. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10 (noting a judge’s failed attempt to curtail attorney’s research of prospective jurors).
79. See supra note 12.
80. Redgrave and Stover, supra note 3, at 214.
81. Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, Are Tweeters or Googlers in
Your Jury Box?, 46 ARIZ. ATT’Y 38, 45 (2010).
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papers’ letters to the editor, online petitions, campaign contri82
83
butions, club membership pages, and online public records
are all rife with potentially relevant information. Some practitioners even advocate asking prospective jurors about their Internet usage so attorneys can narrow the focus of their re84
search.
While pretrial research has been greatly aided by the Internet and the information sources listed above, such research
can be contextualized by examining the traditional standards of
a fair and impartial jury.
E. DEFINING A FAIR TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL JURY
The right to an impartial jury is created by an amalgam of
85
86
the Sixth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, and the
87
Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend88
ments. A partial jury implicates considerable constitutional
89
concerns, and a verdict delivered by a partial jury may be
90
overturned on appeal. The Supreme Court has defined an impartial jury as one that is “capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before it” and not based on outside
91
knowledge or prejudice.
82. Id.
83. Frederick, supra note 11.
84. See Vesna Jaksic, A New Headache for Courts: Blogging Jurors,
LAW.COM (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?
id=1174035813248 (“Any lawyer who does not inquire during jury selection
about a juror’s Internet presence—whether it be a Web site, a blog, an account
on MySpace or an account on Match.com—hasn’t done their [sic] job.”).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
89. McGee, supra note 59, at 303–04 (“The failure to provide an accused
with a fair hearing essentially strips him of his constitutional right and ‘violates even the minimal standards of due process.’” (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1961))).
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Agoncillo, 515 N.W.2d 508, 514 –15 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994) (considering whether alleged juror bias necessitated overturning verdict
on appeal).
91. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
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One of the problems with ascertaining the effects that pretrial research has on the fairness of trials is one of evidence.
Because there are so many variables involved, it is difficult to
say with certainty what influence the jury selection has on the
92
outcome of the trial. If a prospective juror feels intimidated or
threatened by the amount of invasive research parties have
conducted, such research may amount to obstruction of jus93
tice. Obstruction of justice is committed, as defined in the relevant federal statute, by “[w]hoever corruptly . . . endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror . . . in
94
the discharge of his duty . . . .” This statutory provision also
95
applies to prospective jurors.
By grafting the new technology of Internet research onto
the existing framework created by this traditional jurisprudence, Part II of this Note examines the practical effect of technological advances on longstanding notions of trial fairness.
II. THE EFFECT OF PRETRIAL INTERNET RESEARCH ON
FAIRNESS OF TRIALS
Several commentators have noted the seeming unfairness
96
of pretrial juror investigation. This Part first addresses and
attempts to dispel the concerns raised by critics of juror investigation—that the practice infringes upon prospective jurors’
privacy, amounts to a manipulation of the jury pool, may lead
to pretextual strikes for cause, and ultimately undermines the
fairness of trials. This Part then analyzes the potential benefits
of pretrial investigation—arguing that the practice decreases
the likelihood that strikes will be based on stereotypes, increases the number of meritorious strikes for cause, and decreases the importance of peremptory strikes.
A. DISPELLING THE TYPICAL CRITICISMS OF PRETRIAL INTERNET
JURY RESEARCH
Critics of pretrial Internet research point to several bases
for their objections to the practice—among them privacy concerns and concerns over the manipulation of the justice sys92. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 463 (“[T]here appears no
way to assert with certainty that a successful verdict in an actual trial is directly and solely attributable to . . . jury selection.”).
93. See id. at 479.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006).
95. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 324 (1966).
96. See, e.g., Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 216–17.
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97

tem. Each of these concerns is ultimately aimed at ensuring a
98
fair trial for all parties. This Section identifies and dispels the
most prevalent of these arguments.
1. Although Pretrial Jury Investigation Implicates Privacy
Concerns, Such Actions Do Not Amount to an Invasion of
Jurors’ Privacy.
One of the frequent criticisms of both traditional jury consulting and Internet-based research is the potential infringe99
ment on prospective jurors’ right to privacy. Even practitioners offering tips on how to most effectively research prospective
jurors acknowledge that such Internet research may be inva100
sive. Courts have found that prospective jurors should have
no reasonable expectation of privacy based on their actions on
the Internet—their chat room discussions, publicly accessible
101
Facebook profiles, or message board posts. This standard is
complicated, however, because much of the research for relevant information is conducted through channels that prospective jurors have limited control over, such as online church bul102
letins or other social club newsletters.
Regardless of whether jurors should have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their online presence—and thus,
a constitutional right to privacy—the research and use of such
information in jury selection certainly implicates privacy con103
cerns. When attorneys confront jurors with ostensibly private
information during the jury-selection process—often in front of
other prospective jurors, the court, and attorneys—jurors may
feel like their privacy has been invaded, whether or not the ac-

97. See, e.g., McGee, supra note 59, at 318–20.
98. See id. at 318.
99. See, e.g., Lisa C. Wood, Social Media Use During Trials: Status Updates from the Jury Box, 24 ANTITRUST 90, 93 (2009).
100. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14 (“[S]ince the foregoing [recommended] seventeen Internet searches are fairly invasive, a careful lawyer should
avoid overt references to a juror’s personal information during jury selection
and trial.”).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 –85
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding chat room and e-mail discussions are not entitled to
a reasonable expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823,
831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding personal websites not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy).
102. See Frederick, supra note 11.
103. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 480.
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tion meets the legal standard for invasion of privacy. This reaction may taint the proceedings by “lead[ing] to resentment of
105
the attorney who conducted the inquiry.”
Extensive pretrial research of prospective jurors can implicate significant privacy concerns:
The questioning of prospective jurors can sometimes delve . . . into intensely private and intimate details of the questioned individual’s life
. . . . [T]hey employ trial consultants . . . who may suggest voir dire interrogations that might violate privacy. This affront to the sensibilities of the panelists might nonetheless be justifiable, on balance, if
there were clearly demonstrable countervailing benefits . . . . Contrasting our system with that of England, where both peremptory
challenges and pretrial investigations have been virtually eliminated,
one scholar observed: “In the United States, where voir dire allows for
vast intrusions into individuals’ lives, the result has not been greater
impartiality, but a proliferation of methods by which skilled litigators
106
and expensive consultants tailor juries to their clients’ needs.”

These privacy concerns, however, are ultimately outweighed by the perceived benefits of trial consultants. Courts
have recognized and sanctioned jury consultants’ rights to con107
duct research on prospective jurors. Such research often involves more invasive measures than modern-day Internet research, such as seeking information from jurors’ neighbors and
108
friends. There have been numerous technological advances—
including searchable Internet records and social networking—
that allow for less invasive research into prospective jurors’
109
backgrounds. Despite the unease that jurors may feel when
being confronted with information from their seemingly private
110
online profiles, there is generally no privacy right implicated,
as long as attorneys abide by their ethical guidelines against
directly contacting prospective jurors by, for example, adding a
prospective juror as a “friend” on Facebook to gain access to
111
that juror’s profile.
104. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 217 (“Being confronted with
this [seemingly private] information in open court could realistically diminish
a prospective juror’s feeling of privacy.”).
105. Id.
106. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 480.
107. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
108. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 217.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 –85
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
111. See Wood, supra note 99 (“[Attorneys] have been admonished in several matters where they gained access to confidential Internet sites under
false pretenses.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2010)
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Further, the hypothetical resentment a prospective juror
may feel toward an attorney asking probing, personal questions
is too attenuated and theoretical to constitute the basis for an
112
unfair trial. Practitioners advise attorneys to proceed tactfully when asking questions about information gleaned from pre113
trial Internet research. Such tact or avoidance of direct ques114
tioning can help to allay jurors’ privacy concerns. Further,
115
states may consider implementing a Juror Bill of Rights.
While many commentators rest their objections to pretrial
research on the privacy interests of prospective jurors, many
others point to the tendency for attorneys to use this information to manipulate the justice system.
2. Allowing Parties to Conduct Internet Research on
Prospective Jurors Will Lead to Decreased Manipulation of
Juries and Verdicts.
Many critics of both jury consulting and pretrial Internet
research of potential jurors decry the practices as manipulative
116
of the trial process. Even though peremptory strikes and
challenges for cause are premised on improving fairness in trials, attorneys often use these techniques instead to gain a com117
petitive advantage over the opposing party. This angling for
advantage seems antithetical to the purposes of voir dire,
which is to determine whether jurors possess biases that
118
should disqualify them from service. Further, such methods
(“[A lawyer shall not] communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective
juror or other official] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law
or court order.”).
112. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 463–64 (arguing that it
would be nearly impossible to show with empirical evidence that jury selection
alone generally cannot be shown to result in favorable verdicts).
113. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14 (cautioning attorneys not to “reference a juror’s personal information during jury selection”).
114. See id. (arguing that background research on potential jurors can be
“fairly invasive”).
115. See infra Part III.B.
116. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 472–73 (discussing the
“public perception of the jury being manipulated by psychological devices”).
117. See Marni Becker-Avin, The Real Purpose of Voir Dire, THE RIGHT JURY, http://www.therightjury.com/publications_real_purpose.html ( last visited
Jan. 5, 2012) (“There is conflict between the inherent purpose of voir dire,
which is to find impartial jurors from a pool representative of the community,
and the true yet unstated purpose of every attorney, which is to find jurors
predisposed to their position.”).
118. See Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1967)
(“[T]he purpose of the voir dire is to ascertain disqualifications, not to afford
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run counter to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Batson v. Ken119
120
in which the Court contucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama,
121
demned and outlawed race- and sex-based challenges.
Because courts have allowed both pretrial jury investigation and peremptory challenges, the practice of Internet research of prospective jurors is preferable to the more invasive
research alternatives. Concerns about the manipulation of justice by jury research and selection metrics are more pronounced
when only one side has access to jury consultants and research
122
assistants. This unequal distribution of resources contributes
123
to disparities in the fairness of trial preparation. All parties,
however, are able to ascertain tendencies among prospective
jurors through the use of comparatively inexpensive Internet
124
research. This allows parties to make peremptory challenges
that balance the jury pool by eliminating the most objectionable
125
potential members. This elimination of jurors with obvious
126
predilections will result in the fairest possible jury pool.

individual analysis in depth to permit a party to choose a jury that fits into
some mold that he believes appropriate for his case.”); Reid Hastie & Nancy
Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ Reflections on
The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 957, 975 (1996) (“[S]cientific jury selection methods are not applied to
identify and eliminate prejudiced and partial jurors; the major effect of the
lengthy examinations and the exercise of peremptory challenges is to create
systematically unrepresentative panels and, sometimes, to produce unbalanced juries.”).
119. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding prosecutor from peremptorily challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race); see also Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying the principles of Batson
to civil trials).
120. 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to cover peremptory challenges
based on sex).
121. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE
IDEAL DEMOCRACY 175 (1994) (describing jury consulting as contradicting “the
new ethic” outlined by the Supreme Court in Batson and J.E.B.).
122. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 471 (“The impartiality
mandate would seem most threatened when only one side has access to jury
science.”).
123. See id.
124. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 211–12 (“[Pretrial Internet
juror research] will increasingly level the playing field between the plaintiff ’s
and defendant’s bar.”).
125. See id. at 475 (“Within the adversarial context, it is presumed each
side will eliminate those prospective jurors most favorable to the other side
and that the end result will be an impartial jury.”).
126. See id.
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3. Pretrial Jury Research Will Not Lead to an Increase in
Pretextual Strikes for Cause
When considering pretrial jury research, many commentators point out that information gleaned from research may lead
an attorney to attempt to make a strike for cause where he may
127
otherwise invoke a peremptory strike. Critics of the practice
have pointed to this possibility as the one legal foundation on
which a future ban of jury consulting and pretrial investigation
128
could rest.
It is possible that an attorney would use a strike for cause
in an attempt to evade the Batson and J.E.B. decisions and ex129
clude prospective jurors based on either their sex or race. If
an attorney wants to exclude minorities or women from the jury, she could focus her pretrial research on investigating black
or female jurors’ Internet presence in an attempt to build a case
for a challenge for cause. If successful in the challenge for
cause, the party would retain its allotted number of peremptory
130
challenges.
These concerns, while not baseless, do not outweigh the
benefits of pretrial Internet research of prospective jurors. If
attorneys did attempt to “fish” for information for a pretextual
strike for cause, there are several safeguards in place that
would protect the sanctity of the fair trial. First, when considering a motion to strike for cause, a judge must look at the totali131
ty of the circumstances. If an attorney were attempting to
strike all women or all African-Americans for cause, for exam127. See, e.g., Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3 (arguing that questions tailored to individual jurors after research is more likely to lead to a successful
strike for cause).
128. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 481 (arguing that advocates
of banning jury consultant “must demonstrate something singularly pernicious about consulting, such as unduly facilitating or encouraging race—or
gender—based exclusions outlawed by the Supreme Court . . . .”).
129. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson ruling
to peremptory challenges based on juror’s sex); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson’s holding to include civil trials); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding prosecutor from peremptorily challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race); 76 AM.
JUR. Trials § 61 (“Trial counsel may object . . . to individual veniremen for
cause, or peremptorily.”).
130. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 65 (2000) (“Challenges for cause should be
pursued by counsel to avoid wasting peremptory challenges.”).
131. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Miller, 565 S.E.2d 407, 411 (W. Va. 2002) (“[ W ]hen
considering whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause, a trial court is required to consider the totality of the circumstances and grounds relating to a
potential request to excuse a prospective juror . . . .”).
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ple, that trial strategy would be quite transparent. Further, if
there are pretextual strikes for cause, such strikes would be
132
appealable post trial. While attorneys “gaming” the peremptory strike system is a concern that has led some to advocate
133
for the complete elimination of peremptory strikes, the appreciable benefits of the peremptory strike system justify its retention.
B. PRETRIAL INTERNET INVESTIGATION IS BENEFICIAL FOR
JURORS AND DEFENDANTS ALIKE.
Perhaps because of the notion that researching prospective
jurors in an attempt to gain a favorable jury pool is tantamount
to cheating the judicial system, many people react to this prac134
tice with skepticism. By examining this practice more closely,
however, several benefits of pretrial juror investigation emerge.
1. Jurors Will Be Excluded Based on Stereotype-Alone Less
Often
In attempting to create their ideal jury pool, attorneys often exercise their peremptory strikes to remove potential jurors
135
based on little more than a stereotype or a hunch. Courts
have, in dicta, frowned on disqualifying jurors on stereotypes
136
alone, but have not held such disqualification illegal. With
prospective jurors having more robust online presences, however, attorneys may now invoke their peremptory strikes based
137
on jurors’ actual personalities, activities and predilections.
Lawyers may discover information during their Internet research that they would not have been able to uncover using
138
traditional voir dire alone. Because the information gathered
132. See, e.g., Holly v. Straub, No. 02-10126-BC, 2004 WL 1765525, at *12
(E.D. Mich. July 19, 2004) (considering and rejecting claim “that excusing
. . . jurors for cause was merely a pretext employed to disguise an improper
racial motive or a substitute for unlawful peremptory strikes”).
133. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) ( Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that the goal of eliminating racial discrimination from jury selection “can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely”).
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 465.
136. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (finding a peremptory
strike based on a stereotype “denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror”).
137. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 466 (“Without external information, attorneys almost inevitably rely on stereotypes and intuitions.”).
138. See Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery
Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2009, at 22–23 (“Trial consultants regularly use Internet research as a means of vetting prospective jurors and learn-
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from this outside research is more “detailed and accurate” than
139
an attorney’s stereotype or intuition about prospective jurors,
attorneys will be better able to accurately and effectively use
140
their peremptory strikes.
Many commentators advocate for the elimination of peremptory strikes in order to allay concerns about their manipu141
lative nature and potential misuse. Former Supreme Court
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued for completely eliminating
142
peremptory strikes. One of the main objections to such challenges is that they, by necessity, rely on attorneys’ excluding
143
prospective jurors based on stereotypes. By allowing noninvasive pretrial Internet research on prospective jurors, however,
attorneys’ reliance on stereotypes in invoking peremptory challenges—and the constitutional objection to such reliance—will
diminish.
2. There Will Be More Legitimate Strikes for Cause
When exercised for legitimate reasons, strikes for cause are
144
almost universally upheld. If a juror has either a prior relaing information jurors may not reveal on jury questionnaires or during voir
dire, ‘including how they vote, how they spend money and if they’ve spoken
out on controversial issues.’” (citing Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? You May
Want to Edit Your Online Profile, L.A TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008)); Greene &
Spaeth, supra note 81 (“[A]ttorneys can use social networks . . . to learn more
about their prospective jurors . . . . [P]aying attention to jurors’ social networking, blogs and Web sites can tell a lot about their values, attitudes and experiences that would never be fully revealed in voir dire.”).
139. Nesson, supra note 51, at 2.
140. See id. ( predicting that technological advances in jury investigation
will lead to increased transparency in peremptory strikes and may eventually
force courts “either to rationalize peremptory strikes or eliminate them
altogether”).
141. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE
AMERICAN COURTROOM 224 (1994) (“Eliminating peremptory challenges
means destroying the only means through which lawyers can . . . ‘get a jury
you like the look of ’ . . . . And it would mean that decades of stereotypes about
how people of various ethnic groups are likely to vote would become moot.
Black and white, fat and skinny, young and old, transit worker and physicist
all would be treated alike.”).
142. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
143. See, e.g., Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror ’s Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 590–92 (1996).
144. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 66 (2000) (explaining that review of trial
judges’ grants of strikes for cause are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of
discretion standard); see also, e.g., Black v. CSX Transp., Inc., 648 S.E. 2d 610,
617 (W. Va. 2007) (finding that trial court abused its discretion when it denied
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tionship with the parties, attorneys, or witnesses, or, has a
provable bias against one party, he will not contribute to a fair
145
and impartial jury pool. Pretrial Internet research on prospective jurors assists meritorious strikes for cause by potentially revealing something that would disqualify a juror on its
own basis or by providing a questioning avenue for attorneys to
follow in voir dire. By tailoring their questions, attorneys may
increase their likelihood of discovering something during voir
146
dire that could lead to a challenge for cause. Such tailoring is
important, as many view peremptory challenges as one of the
only mechanisms for eliminating jurors with a strong suspected
147
bias.
3. Informal Pretrial Jury Research Equalizes Resources
Between Wealthy and Non-Wealthy Parties
One of the most important roles that pretrial jury research
serves is as an equalizer between wealthy and nonwealthy parties. Whereas only attorneys for wealthy parties can usually afford jury consultants, any attorney with an Internet connection
148
can conduct online research on prospective jurors. This is especially important since the root of many of the fairness concerns outlined above is the fear that parties have dispropor149
Since Internet research provides both
tionate resources.
parties with the same opportunities at their fingertips, fewer
150
advantages will inhere to the wealthier parties. Smaller law

a lawyers repeated motions for cause).
145. See, e.g., 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 68 (2000) ( listing factors to consider
whether a juror will be fair and impartial when deciding whether to dismiss
for cause).
146. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3 (“Any insight into a juror’s personality permits a trial attorney to tailor his or her voir dire questions in such
a way as to maximize the likelihood of revealing a particular trait that may
support a challenge for cause.”).
147. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 484 (“If the jurisdiction
is one that limits voir dire inquiry, or prospective jurors are not candid about
their biases, the voir dire process will not provide adequate opportunity to create grounds for a challenge for cause.”).
148. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 211–12.
149. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 473 (“Instead of a jury
representing a cross-section of the values of the community, it may seem a
body stacked with people holding biases favoring the side with the trial consultant, or the best trial consultant.”).
150. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 13 (“[T]he lawyer’s team can accomplish
the same outside research performed by jury consultants without the expense.”).
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firms will also be able to better compete with their larger
151
counterparts.
Further, the Internet allows attorneys to use jury investi152
gation in smaller cases. This capability will ensure that even
when there are small amounts at stake, parties will have the
153
benefit of research on prospective jurors. If pretrial Internet
research is a beneficial practice, as this Note argues it is, then
the process should be available to every party in every jury trial. The cost-effective and equalizing nature of Internet research
154
makes this a feasible goal.
4. Pretrial Internet Research Makes Juries Inherently More
Fair and Impartial
Ultimately, the benefits described above lead to the conclusion that permitting attorneys to conduct research on prospective jurors causes the resulting jury pool to be fairer and more
impartial. Because resources are better balanced between parties, the jury pool will not favor one side, and parties will bal155
ance each other out in their peremptory strikes. Strier and
Shestowsky, in their analysis of the effect of jury consultants
on the fairness of trials, write:
Within the adversarial context, it is presumed each side will eliminate those prospective jurors most favorable to the other side and
that the end result will be an impartial jury. Yet this assumes equal
resources and skills for the two sides. The viability of the adversary
system to ensure a fair and impartial jury and trial, in jury selection
as well as in other stages of the trial, is sorely tested when the adversaries possess unequal resources. In this light, the major ethical problem with social science in the courtroom is not the techniques themselves but rather the fact that, in our society, the condition for
156
equality of resources is most often not met.

Because of the increasing use of Internet research to gather information on prospective jurors, the resources of wealthy
and nonwealthy parties have, to a large extent, been equal151. See Jonathan M. Redgrave, Litigation and Technology: How the Internet is Changing the Practice, 47 THE FED. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 25, 25 (“As a result [of the Internet], smaller firms can now access research materials just as
quickly and efficiently as their larger counterparts.”).
152. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 211–12 (“The internet’s vast
information resources permit litigators, even in small cases, to immediately
access information about prospective jurors . . . .”).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 475 (citing VALERIE P. HANS
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 93–94 (1986)).
156. Id.
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157

ized. The equalizing nature of this pretrial research dispels
the concerns that unequal resources lead to different levels of
158
trial preparation, and ultimately to unfair trials.
Further, pretrial Internet research, coupled with traditional voir dire questioning, is much more likely to reveal actual biases that would preclude a juror from being able to decide the
159
case based only on the presented evidence. Thus, by augmenting traditional voir dire with outside Internet research,
attorneys will ultimately be able to strike down more prospective jurors that would be prejudiced against their position.
With each side striking prejudiced jurors, the resulting jury
pool is increasingly balanced and impartial.
III. A COPROMISED SOLUTION: MORE COURT
FACILITATION OF PRETRIAL INTERNET RESEARCH,
MORE CONCERN FOR PROSPECTIVE JURORS’ PRIVACY
RIGHTS
As outlined above, there are numerous appreciable benefits
to pretrial Internet research of prospective jurors—jurors being
excluded from service for their actual beliefs and not stereotypes, an increase in successful strikes for cause, an equalization of pretrial strategies between wealthy and less fortunate
parties, and an increase in the fairness and impartiality of ju160
ries. Accordingly, courts should uniformly release potential
juror lists prior to trial in order to give attorneys ample time to
conduct research on prospective jurors. Because there are considerable privacy concerns for jurors, however, state legislatures should pass a standard “Juror Bill of Rights” to allay these legitimate privacy concerns.
A. COURTS SHOULD UNIFORMLY RELEASE LISTS OF POTENTIAL
JURORS PRIOR TO TRIAL
As it stands, many, but not all courts release to attorneys
161
lists of potential jurors prior to the start of trial. In order to
157. See supra Part II.B.3.
158. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 475 (discussing how peremptory strikes create unfairness mainly in situations where adversarial parties have unequal resources).
159. See id. (“Within the adversarial context, it is presumed each side will
eliminate those prospective jurors most favorable to the other side and that
the end result will be an impartial jury.”).
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. See, e.g., State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 452–53 (N.C. 1977).
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gain the benefits of pretrial online juror investigation—a decreased reliance on stereotypes, a leveled playing field between
162
wealthy and poorer parties and the resulting impartiality —
courts should release a list of prospective jurors in advance of
all jury trials. Further, courts should be more explicit about allowing Internet research of prospective jurors. Currently, practitioners and judges seem to operate in a system of winks and
163
nudges—courts have sanctioned pretrial investigation, but
practitioners still advise against mentioning that investigation
164
during voir dire. The result is the occasional judge admonishing attorneys for what he perceives to be ethically questionable
165
behavior. By sanctioning and providing this list, however,
courts will be saying that this pretrial research is both acceptable and expected.
B. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT A “JUROR BILL OF RIGHTS” TO
ALLAY PRIVACY CONCERNS
Despite the efficacy of pretrial Internet research, prospective jurors still have legitimate concerns about potential inva166
sions of their privacy. The balancing of these concerns with
the effectiveness of the research should result in a nationwide
“Juror Bill of Rights,” similar to those that have been proposed
167
or enacted in several states. Such a Bill of Rights would come
in the mail with a prospective jurors’ summons and advise the
juror about her rights. This disclosure would notify the juror
that she had been selected for the jury pool and inform her that
her limited personal information has been released to attorneys
who are bound by ethical codes and the rules of the court to
keep such information confidential. This enclosure would further notify the juror that attorneys for both parties have the
right to conduct publicly available Internet searches for relevant information about the juror. Finally, this Bill of Rights
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988)
(“There is no doubt that pretrial investigations of prospective jurors are both
legal and common.”).
164. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14 (cautioning against “overt reference
to a juror’s personal information” that has been discovered through outside
research).
165. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10.
166. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1996) (showing that a factor in Arizona jury reform was promulgating a “Bill of Rights” for Arizona jurors).
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would provide contact information for the court, and encourage
prospective jurors to report attorneys who attempt to contact
them through online social media.
This proposed system would have immense benefits for jurors, courts, and the parties themselves. Jurors would feel that
their privacy interests are being protected by the court, and the
contact information would provide them with an outlet if they
feel those privacy rights were being trampled. The court would
benefit because with jurors vigilant for privacy-related ethical
violations, practitioners would be less likely to cross impermissible boundaries. Finally, the parties would benefit because this
previously surreptitious practice would be brought out into the
open and officially sanctioned by the courts.
CONCLUSION
Pretrial Internet research on prospective jurors is now a
widespread practice among attorneys. Attorneys have long researched prospective jurors either themselves or through jury
consultants, but the Internet has made such research much
more cost- and time-effective. Because such research seems antithetical to the system of justice, it implicates several policy
and procedural concerns—commentators have argued that it
invades juror’s privacy, amounts to manipulation of the justice
system, and may lead to pretextual strikes for cause.
Ultimately, however, this practice of Internet-based research has many advantages over traditional jury investigation
and consulting. Among these are an increased balance between
rich and poor parties, jury selection based on actual knowledge
instead of stereotype, and an increased success rate in attempts
to strike jurors for cause. By acknowledging this pretrial research as an effective means of trial preparation, while maintaining jurors’ privacy rights through the proposed Juror Bill of
Rights, courts can further this trend towards fairer and more
impartial juries.

